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The Fund has already produced an evaluation of the lessons that could be drawn from the 
crisis in Argentina.2  That assessment mainly dealt with Argentina’s authorities’ errors that 
lead to the crisis and, to some extent, also with the role that the Fund played in supporting 
those policy failures.  
 
This paper analyses Argentina’s experience in dealing with the Fund during the aftermath of 
the crisis3 and draws some lessons on what changes could be introduced into two of the most 
critical policies of the Fund, i.e. conditionality (on both, structural and macroeconomic 
objectives) and its role in dealing with full-blown debt crisis.  
   
The first section of this paper analyzes whether the structural reforms included in the two 
arrangements signed with the country after 2002 were strictly critical to the achievement of  
Argentina’s macroeconomic objectives and foremost, regarding its debt sustainability.  We 
conclude that some of the structural conditionality was unnecessary and that when the 
required reforms are beyond the reach of the government’s executive branch, performance 
criteria could actually backfire. 
                                                 
1
  I have benefited greatly from discussions and comments provided by Roberto Lavagna, Guillermo 
Nielsen and Pedro Lacoste.  I am particularly thankful to José Costa and Cecilia Todesca Bocco for 
their insightful suggestions. This article, however, expresses only my own personal views. The author 
is Executive Director at the IMF for the Southern Cone countries.  
2
 See Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), “Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in 
Argentina 1991-2001”, July 2004. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/arg/eng/index.htm.  
3
 The paper was drafted in September 2005.  
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In the second section we look into Argentina’s experience on macroeconomic conditionality 
trying to explore whether it is sensible to pursue a one-size-fits-all primary surplus criterion.  
We conclude that it was not appropriate to press Argentina to achieve similar fiscal surpluses 
as those included in arrangements with countries like Turkey or Brazil, since the underling 
comparisons were not tenable.  
 
The third section considers Argentina’s experience in dealing with the “Lending into arrears” 
policy and particularly whether the Fund, in conditioning its new lending to demonstrations 
of “good faith”, is consistently avoiding the moral hazard that stems from bailing out private 
creditors.  We conclude that the Fund seems to be still undecided on what role (if any) it 
should play when a sovereign is in financial distress and needs to restructure its debt with 
private creditors.  We also conclude that using the Fund’s financial leverage to impose 
ambitious fiscal surpluses and conditioning new lending to improvements in the debt 
restructuring offer could be as morally hazardous as bailing-out private creditors. 
 
In short, using Argentina’s experience as a model, the paper draws some lessons and 
proposes changes in the Fund’s approach to conditionality and to its role in full-blown debt 
crisis. We think that it is particularly timely to take stock of these lessons since the Fund has 
just launched a review of the Fund’s Medium Term Strategy and both, conditionality and the 








CONDITIONALITY ON STRUCTURAL REFORMS:  Should the Fund limit them to 
the strictly indispensable?  
 
It is a common understanding that the Fund should focus on macroeconomic objectives 
usually regarded as the core areas of IMF’s responsibility (i.e. monetary, fiscal and 
exchange rate policies as well as financial sector issues).  However, the identification and 
inclusion of structural conditionality in arrangements with member countries is justified  
when it is instrumental to the achievement of the aforementioned macroeconomic 
objectives.  
 
The Fund should, consequently, exercise restrain in using its financial leverage to impose 
structural conditionality as “performance criteria”4 in arrangements with borrowing 
countries.  In our view this could be boiled down into three principles:  
 
  be as less intrusive as possible (ownership of reforms is compromised when 
citizens see them as resulting from external pressures);  
 limit conditionality on structural reforms to the strictly indispensable (those 
that truly compromise macroeconomic results)5 and; 
                                                 
4
 “Performance Criteria” are mandatory targets, i.e. variables or measures whose observance or 
implementation is established as a formal condition for the making of purchases or disbursements 
under a Fund arrangement. Performance criteria should be applied to clearly-specified variables or 
measures that can be objectively monitored by the staff and are so critical for the achievement of the 
program goals or monitoring implementation that purchases or disbursements under the arrangement 
should be interrupted in cases of nonobservance (based on “Selected Decisions and Selected 
Documents of the International Monetary Fund”, Twenty-Eight Issue, December 31, 2003, Use of 
Fund Resources, page 238). 
5
 According to “Guidance on the Design and Implementation of IMF Conditionality, June 3, 2002” 
instruments such as prior actions or performance criteria are “to be used sparingly and should be 
focused on those measures that are necessary for the achievement of the macroeconomic goals of the 
program and to safeguard Fund resources.” (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, as we will discuss 
further, this is far from being the practice.   
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  always give governments flexibility in implementing structural reforms 
(cornering governments with fixed or very ambitious deadlines creates fatigue 
and may play into the hands of those opposing reforms, particularly in the 
cases where the executive branch of a government needs the support of the 
congress to implement them).  
 
Using Argentina’s experience to illustrate these points we can quote two examples of 
misplaced structural reform:    
 
1) In 2002 the staff insisted in getting the Congress to overturn a law that had been 
enacted by the last military dictatorship (i.e. the “Economic Subversion Law”).    
Admittedly this law gave leeway to the executive branch of the government to 
prosecute almost any economic activity by adducing that it was “subverting” 
order (imposed by the military junta).  It was an awful piece of legislation that had 
never been applied by any democratic government and that Mr. Duhalde’s 
government6 had no intention of applying. Nevertheless during the financial, 
economic and social turmoil that followed the abandonment of the Currency 
Board (“Convertibilidad”) and the declaration of default in January 2002, some 
voices were raised in Argentina on the need to punish those considered  
“responsible” for the capital flight that preceded the debacle.  In this context, the 
aforementioned “Economic Subversion Law” appeared as giving the necessary 
legal basis to those isolated attempts.   The law was finally overturned, but at a 
great political cost for a government that had to withstand accusations of 
sheltering those that had benefited from capital flight from the country.  Naturally, 
                                                 
6
 Mr. Eduardo Duhalde was Argentina’s President between January 1, 2002 and May 25, 2003. He 
was elected by Congress at the climax of the crisis and after the resignation of President De la Rúa 
and three other ephemeral successors.   
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the government had several other more sensible priorities on which to spend its 
very scarce “political capital” more worthily.7   
2) Moving to a more recent experience. In the stand-by arrangement approved in 
September 2003, the Fund staff insisted in including structural conditionality (as a 
“structural performance criterion”) on the approval of a new fiscal revenue 
sharing system.  This required Congress to pass a new “Co-participation Law” to 
settle, on the basis of objective criteria8, the distribution of fiscal revenues 
amongst Argentina’s provinces and between the provinces as a whole on the one 
hand, and the federal government on the other.  Fiscal revenue is currently shared 
on the basis of a knotty legal system that bundles many ad-hoc and old laws that 
result in a very intricate process. Needless to say, it is in Argentina’s long-term 
interest to replace this knotty system with a straightforward new revenue sharing 
arrangement that reflects objective criteria for distribution, rather than the over-
representation9 of small provinces at the Senate.  In fact, Argentina’s constitution 
itself requires—as a result of its last amendment—that such a new law should be 
enacted, so in this specific case there is no ownership problem regarding this 
particular structural reform.  However, the approval of a new revenue-sharing law 
poses extremely difficult political challenges.  Although applying “objective 
criteria” to distribute scarce fiscal revenue is desirable, such a change would 
benefit the more populated provinces at the expense of smaller provinces.  
Naturally, smaller provinces—and Senators representing them—oppose such a 
                                                 
7
 Incidentally this was presented as a sort of prior action on the part of the Fund to enter into formal 
discussions with Argentina on an economic program to be supported by the Fund. The prior action 
was met but, nevertheless, the year 2002 passed by and Argentina was unable to get the desired 
support during this most critical time of its economic history, despite the fact that the key 
macroeconomic indicators were already pointing in the right direction. 
8
 “Argentina—Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding”, September 10, 2003, page 10, paragraph 31. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2003/arg/03/index.htm.    
9
 According to Argentina’s constitution each province is represented by three senators, regardless of 
its number of inhabitants (Article 54 of the Argentine Constitution).  
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reform.  As a consequence, to comply with the Fund’s conditionality the federal 
government should itself reduce its participation in fiscal revenue.  Needless to 
say, this would compromise its capacity to generate the ambitious primary surplus 
required to serve the country’s public debt. There were several attempts to pass a 
new co-participation law but all failed because it proved to be impossible to find a 
balance between the “entitlement” of  Buenos Aires province (by far the most 
populated) for a bigger chunk of fiscal revenue and the capacity of senators 
representing small provinces to block such a reform.  The current government 
managed to ensure fiscal discipline in provincial governments (provinces are 
generating record fiscal surpluses after more than a decade in the red)10 and would 
have been more than happy to have such a law approved by Congress.  However 
as it was publicly known that the Fund was conditioning its financial support to 
the approval of such a piece of legislation, provinces felt that they had gained 
leverage in the negotiations with the federal government.11  In short, the Fund’s 
requirement backfired12 by creating a sort of “political rent” that played into the 
hands of provinces indebted to the federal government.  Rather than helping the 
federal government to rein in provincial expenditures (as the government was, 
indeed, doing) it benefited those opposing reform.  
 
Thus, the lesson that we can draw from Argentina’s experience is that when a Fund 
program imposes structural conditionality that requires action that is beyond the reach 
of the executive branch of government (e.g. requiring specific action by congresses, 
                                                 
10
 Since 2003, the Government has accomplished primary fiscal surpluses (at the National Public 
Sector, i.e., including provinces) well above 3% of GDP. 
11
 During the crisis, several provinces issued provincial bonds that were circulating together with the 
peso in Argentina’s territory.  The federal government withdrew these cuasi-money and the provinces 
remain indebted to the federal government.  
12
 The government suspended the pursuance of this performance criterion when it came to the 
conclusion that achieving it attempted against its decision to put together an ambitious primary 
surplus 
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provinces or courts) the end-result may be at odds with the initially intended effect. 
At the same time, the Fund should restrain from requiring structural reforms that do 
not truly compromise macroeconomic results, avoiding both the waste of the 
government’s political capital and reform fatigue.  




PRIMARY FISCAL SURPLUSES: IS THERE A ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL PRIMARY 
SURPLUS CRITERION OR SHOULD ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE FUND SET 
FISCAL PRIMARY SURPLUS CRITERIA ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS? 
 
In this point let us start by referring directly to Argentina’s experience.  Some at the Fund 
argued that Argentina’s target of a 3 percent of fiscal surplus was too modest and 
supported their position by comparing Argentina’s surplus with Brazil’s (4,25%) and 
Turkey’s (6,5%).  These comparisons have the attractiveness of simplicity, however, they 
are disingenuous.  
 
 Due to the privatization program implemented in Argentina during the 90s 
(with the Fund’s enthusiastic approval and IFIs support), Argentina’s 
government has no public enterprises left and consequently no revenue 
additional to that of tax collection.  Brazil and Turkey do have public 
enterprises and in both cases, these have made significant contributions to the 
fiscal surpluses obtained by their governments.   
 Because of the 1994 reform to Argentina’s social security system (reform that 
at the time was very much cheered by the Fund) the government has no net 
revenues coming from pension’s contributions.  Whereas this reform was 
aimed at reducing the governments medium and long term liabilities, in the 
short run, the government has, however, to continue providing pensions and 
other social security services to all pensioners that remain in the pay-as-you-
go system and, also cover a Minimum Universal Benefit.  In 2004, the 
corresponding fiscal transfers to the retirement and pension fund 
administrators [AFJP] amounted to 0.8 percent of GDP.  This is not, 
fortunately, the situation neither in Brazil nor in Turkey. 
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 More importantly, it is necessary to recall that Argentina’s social and 
economic context does not support the comparison.  The Argentine crisis 
could not be contained and produced a widespread and sudden 
impoverishment of the population.  Sudden impoverishment, unlike structural 
poverty, generates profound political resentment and social instability.  The 
country was on the brink of generalized civil unrest.  Unemployment peaked 
at 21.5 percent in May 2002. It now stands at 12.1% percent (and would be 
higher without government-supported employment program known as “Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar”).  Conversely, Brazil and Turkey could avoid the crisis, 
consequently their population was spared the sudden impoverishment 
experience, and their level of unemployment is substantially lower. 
Last but not least, Argentina is the only one of the three main Fund’s debtors that has not 
received any net financial support from the IFI’s, nor from bilateral creditors, since late 
2001. To the contrary, Argentina has protected the Fund’s preferred creditor status, and in 
this context has made large net transfers to the IFIs (of over 13.5 billion US dollars) from 
the start of the crisis in January 2002 to August 2005, of which 7.7 billion were paid back 
to the IMF, reducing its debt with the Fund by more than 30% since the beginning of the 
Argentine crisis.13  
 
                                                 
13
 Please find attached at the end of this document the net payments figures for Argentina to the IFIs 
as well as the net payments to the IMF from Argentina and other emerging markets. 




“NO PUBLIC FUNDS USED TO BAIL OUT PRIVATE RISKS”.  IS THIS REALLY 
WORKING? 
 
We are all for avoiding the moral hazard stemming from the use of public funds to cover 
private risks or absorb private losses.  However, in our opinion this “new paradigm” is 
not being applied consistently.  
 
It is an incongruity to decide, on the one hand, that international financial institutions 
(IFIs) should not provide fresh financing to rescue a sovereign debtor in distress because 
this would imply “socializing” private risks whereas, on the other, telling the sovereign 
debtor that if it doesn’t show “good faith” in negotiations with private creditors by 
improving its offer, IFIs will cut-off all refinancing.    
 
We need to agree on whether preventing or minimizing the consequences of a 
government default is a public good to be  pursued.  If in doing so the Fund would secure 
a public good, namely safeguarding financial stability and preventing a harsh adjustment 
that could negatively affect overall welfare, then it should be, in principle, legitimate to 
use public funds to rescue or assist the sovereign.  Conversely, if the public good to be 
pursued is the avoidance of the moral hazard stemming from getting markets to believe 
that lending to sovereign debtors is risk-less because, ultimately, IFIs will act as lenders 
of last resort14(or twist the arm of the government forcing it to generate primary surpluses 
to pay back); then IFIs should stay clear from interfering in any way in the debt 
restructuring negotiations between a sovereign debtor and its private creditors.   
                                                 
14
 Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser depict two moral hazards, as IMF lending to manage debt crisis 
could be interpreted as a form of “insurance” that could “encourage reckless policies in emerging 
economies (debtor moral hazard) and reckless lending by creditors in industrial countries (creditor 
moral hazard)”, Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, August 2004, page 77. 
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As we will discuss below, current practice is, to say the least, ambiguous and may 
possibly imply an abusive use of political and financial leverage (albeit not public funds) 
in pursuance of private interests.   
 
The Fund’s “lending into arrears” (LIA) policy15 requires that sovereign debtors and 
private creditors should attempt, in good faith, to reach an agreement whose overarching 
objective should be to restore financial sustainability for the sovereign in distress.  This 
implies that both parties must act in good faith.  However, financial interests, unhappy 
with the Fund’s hand-off policy, have been quite successful in lobbying some rich 
countries’ governments and the Fund, arguing that “good faith” had to be demonstrated 
by the debtor during negotiations by its readiness to improve its payment offer.16   
 
This is, in our view, inconsistent with the overarching objective of restoring financial 
sustainability and possibly also a breach by private creditors of their “good faith” 
obligation.  Would an “agreement” between a developing country in financial distress 
                                                 
15
 Main documents on the IMF’s Lending into Arrears Policy are available at the IMF’s website, 
mainly:  “IMF Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors”, prepared by the Policy 
Development and Review and Legal Departments, June 14, 1999, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/lending.pdf;  “Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to 
Private Creditors—Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion”, prepared by the International 
Capital Markets, Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments, July 30, 2002, available 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.htm;  Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 
02/107, IMF Board Discusses the Good-Faith Criterion under the Fund Policy on Lending into 
Arrears to Private Creditors, September 24, 2002, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn02107.htm.  
16
 This was repeatedly argued at the Board during discussions on Argentina.  It is also worth noting 
that the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”, 
presented by the IIF (Institute of International Finance) in October 2004, require that, “as a sign of 
good faith”, during the negotiations the debtor should resume partial debt service (to the extent 
feasible and full payment of principal and interest as conditions allow). It seems obvious to us that 
this is a unilateral “sign of good faith” as it does not require from creditors to resume financing during 
the negotiations. The final version of these principles is available at: 
http://www.iif.com/data/public/principles-final_0305.pdf.  
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and a politically backed private creditor lobby ensure a sustainable solution to the debt 
problem, as required by the Fund’s LIA policy?    
 
The result of a negotiation between unequally backed parties will tend to reflect their 
bargaining strength rather than medium term sustainability. Hence, an “agreement” in 
which a debtor faces a politically backed financial lobby that succeeded in conditioning 
the country’s access to Fund’s financial support to its capacity to “demonstrate good-
faith”, will most likely be financially unsustainable and eventually require additional net 
financing from the IFIs.  Such a solution is certainly not in the overall interest of the 
international community.  
 
This is not to say that securing a high level of acceptance by the private creditors for a 
debt-restructuring offer is not in the interest of the sovereign debtor in financial distress.  
However, debt sustainability is not assured by pleasing the private markets nor should 
their acceptance be taken as a reliable objective criterion to evaluate the debtor’s “good 
faith” in complying with the Fund’s LIA policy, as some suggested in Argentina’s case.   
 
It is also important to note that any debt-restructuring proposal requires important fiscal 
efforts.  This makes “ownership” of the policies to be taken by the government essential 
particularly in democratic societies and requires that due consideration be given to the 
interests of all of the country’s creditors and stakeholders, including pensioners, workers 
and direct investors (both domestic and foreign).  
 
In short, it may not be possible to reconcile the new paradigm that considers the use of 
public funds to bail out private creditors erroneous with the expectation that public 
debtors achieve very high levels of acceptance in a restructuring from private creditors. 
 
Specifically in Argentina’s case, some argued that it was necessary for the country to 
ensure a very high level of acceptance of its restructuring proposal so as to regain rapid 
access to capital markets.  The assumption was that the more generous its restructuring 
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proposal was, the less reluctant that potential investors and creditors would be to provide 
new financing to Argentina.  This assumption was, to say the least, questionable as it 
failed to acknowledge the tension between the “attractiveness” of a restructuring proposal 
and the debt-sustainability or capacity of a debtor to honor its terms. The more attractive 
the proposal is for creditors, the more likely that the debtor will have to depend on new 
borrowing and, consequently, the more compromised its future payment capacity will 
result.17   
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that the game of appeasing the creditors with 
extremely generous promises, beyond constituting a breach of good faith18, does not pay 
and that markets, far from penalizing a tough negotiating debtor, line up to lend again 
when prudent fiscal policies ensure improved financial, i.e., fiscal and debt sustainability.  
 
In short, yielding to political pressure of private creditors ends compromising debt 
sustainability and future access to capital markets. To be consistent with the “new 
paradigm” the international community should only support a restructuring agreement 
that, with prudent fiscal policies in place, would ensure the debtor’s capacity to restart 
economic growth, on which its capacity to honor its liabilities ultimately depends.  
                                                 
17
 I acknowledge that some potential creditors, in particular professional investors, may be willing to 
take advantage of the short-term bonanza that could follow a debt-restructuring proposal that 
defaulted creditors could find particularly appealing.  However, they will surely be ready, at the same 
time, to quickly revert their positions at the first symptoms of distress that would likely appear at the 
first hint of the country’s difficulty to borrow enough to honor its restructured commitments.  
  
18
 The “careless promisor” attitude is a breach of good faith in itself.  In French civil law, the 
“overriding rule is that ‘one must not create the expectation that a contract will be forthcoming unless 
one so intends’”. Very much in the same line, in German law, Jhering, the undisputed father of the 
doctrine of “Culpa in Contrahendo” (loosely translated as “fault in negotiating”), considers that a 
“careless promisor”, namely a party making promises that are unlikely to be fulfilled, would be acting 
with “lack of diligence”. It follows that a “careless promisor” would be acting in bad faith and, 
therefore, liable.  







Learning from experience is, of course, of the utmost importance.  There are several 
lessons that we could draw from Argentina’s experience in dealing with the aftermath of 
the crisis.     
 
The Fund seems to be still undecided on what a role it should have, if any, in the event of 
a default from a member country.  This lack of clarity puts the Fund in a hesitant and 
unclear position.  It no longer acts as a lender of last resort out of the fear of inducing a 
moral hazard by absorbing private risks or, even worse, private losses.  However, it does 
not have yet a clear hands-off policy.  It uses, albeit hesitantly, its financial leverage to 
exercise pressure on the sovereign debtor in distress in favor of private financial interests.  
This is, obviously, in response to pressures that the Fund itself gets from some of its 
major shareholders that are unhappy seeing that while their citizens bear the cost of the 
default the Fund and the other IFIs are paid in full in a timely manner.   
 
Last but not least, it should also be noted that the advice provided by the Fund in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis was neither timely nor appropriate and, fortunately, was 
rarely followed by Argentina’s authorities.  This is not to imply that the staff’s position 
was capricious but that the Fund’s view relied on a wrong assessment of Argentina’s 
economic, social and political situation.  In their view, Argentina had a large monetary 
overhang that would rapidly be translated into high inflation if monetary policy were 
relaxed.  Argentina’s authorities considered that there was, instead, a large pent up 
demand and excess production capacity which, in the context of responsible fiscal 
policies, would absorb a substantial growth of money supply and jump start a rapid 
recovery without risking high inflation.  With the benefit of hindsight we now know 
evidence has proven that Argentina’s government was right in its assessment.    
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To put it in a nutshell, the most important lesson that could be distilled from Argentina’s 
most recent experience is that the Fund doesn’t seem to be entirely prepared to deal with 
a full-blown crisis. 
 
The purpose of this analysis is not to dig into past mistakes.  On the contrary we wish to 
look ahead, learning from the past.  Our only aim is to invite reflection on how to prevent 
these mistakes from happening again.    
 
In order to move forward we should take stock and learn from Argentina’s sad 
experience.  We should ensure that the Argentina’s difficulties in dealing with the 
aftermath of the crisis are truly capitalized as a learning experience for the Fund.  It is in 
the interest of us all to ensure that the international community draws the correct lessons 
from Argentina’s crisis so as to be well prepared to promptly and efficiently advice other 
member countries’ authorities that could, hopefully not, confront analogous situations in 
the future.  In particular, by following the philosophy of its own guidelines: “The Fund 
shall be guided by the principle that the member is responsible for the design and 
implementation of its economic policies.”19  
 
                                                 
19
 Guidance on the Design and Implementation of IMF Conditionality, June 3, 2002. 




IFI's Argentina: Net Transfers 
In millions of US$
Year IMF BIRF BID TOTAL
2002 1,606 1,445 1,024 4,074
2003 831 1,387 322 2,539
2004 2,558 296 593 3,446
2005* 2,689 526 278 3,493
Total 7,683 3,654 2,216 13,553
(*) January - August 2005. 
Note: Positive figures denote net payments to the IFI's.
 Exchange rate: 1 SDR = 1.46414 US$
 
 
Net Paymets to the IMF
In US$ million 
2002 2003 2004 2005* Total
Argentina 1,605.5 830.5 2,557.8 2,689.2 7,683.1
Brazil -12,188.8 -4,329.2 5,497.4 8,688.9 -2,331.7
Turkey -6,420.4 983.4 4,409.1 4,915.0 3,887.1
Uruguay -1,736.5 -378.3 -56.3 174.6 -1,996.5
Indonesia 1,371.1 -363.6 1,245.0 956.7 3,209.2
Note: Positive figures denote net payments from the country to the IMF, 
whereas negative figures imply net flows from the IMF to the country.
* January to August 2005
 Exchange Rate: 1 SDR = 1.46414 US$
 
 
